Supreme Court of the United States思维导图

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2023-10-23

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思维导图大纲

https://casetext.com/case/vaden-v-discover-bank-3In

https://casetext.com/case/badgerow-v-walters-6Badgerow v. Walters 142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022)

https://casetext.com/case/quezada-v-bechtel-og-c-constr-servs#p842at 842. But, the court continued, a "principle of

Ibid.

;

id.

Constr.

https://casetext.com/case/quezada-v-bechtel-og-c-constr-servs#p843946 F.3d 837, 843

Servs.,

Inc.

ofP.

https://casetext.com/case/ortiz-espinosa-v-bbva-sec-of-pr-inc-2#p47852 F.3d 36, 47

(

R.,

Inc.

Securities,

https://casetext.com/case/doscher-v-sea-port-grp-sec-llc-2#p381832 F.3d 372, 381–388

LLC

https://casetext.com/case/mccormick-v-am-online-inc#p680em,America

https://casetext.com/case/mccormick-v-am-online-inc#p680684 (CA4 2018) (same), with

https://casetext.com/case/goldman-v-citigroup-global-markets-inc-1#p252em,Citigroup

https://casetext.com/case/goldman-v-citigroup-global-markets-inc-1#p252242, 252–255 (CA3 2016) (holding that the

Brokerage

https://casetext.com/case/magruder-v-fid-brokerage-servs-llc#p287818 F.3d 285, 287–289

Servs.

https://casetext.com/case/badgerow-v-walters-6Badgerow v. Walters 142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022)

https://casetext.com/case/collins-v-yellen#p1782v.

https://casetext.com/case/badgerow-v-walters-6Badgerow v. Walters 142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022)

https://casetext.com/case/whitmore-v-arkansasa,[object Object],495 U.S. 149, 161

https://casetext.com/case/badgerow-v-walters-6Badgerow v. Walters 142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022)

https://casetext.com/case/kokkonen-v-guardian-life-insurance-company-of-america-2See

post,

E.g.,

Dean

Witter

https://casetext.com/case/dean-witter-reynolds-inc-v-byrdem,Reynolds

https://casetext.com/case/moses-h-cone-hospital-v-mercury-constr-corpem,Mercury

https://casetext.com/case/hall-st-assocs-llc-v-mattel-inc-2#p582a,[object Object],556 U.S., at 59

https://casetext.com/case/badgerow-v-walters-6Badgerow v. Walters 142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022)

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-5-appointment-of-arbitrators-or-umpire5

infra

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-7-witnesses-before-arbitrators-fees-compelling-attendance7

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-9-award-of-arbitrators-confirmation-jurisdiction-procedure9

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-10-same-vacation-grounds-rehearing10

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-11-same-modification-or-correction-grounds-order11

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-9-award-of-arbitrators-confirmation-jurisdiction-procedureSections 9

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-10-same-vacation-grounds-rehearing10

https://casetext.com/case/vaden-v-discover-bank-31262.

https://casetext.com/case/badgerow-v-walters-6Badgerow v. Walters 142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022)

First

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-5-appointment-of-arbitrators-or-umpireSection 5

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-5-appointment-of-arbitrators-or-umpire9 U.S.C. § 5

(

the

Second

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-7-witnesses-before-arbitrators-fees-compelling-attendanceSection 7

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-7-witnesses-before-arbitrators-fees-compelling-attendance§ 7

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-4-failure-to-arbitrate-under-agreement-petition-to-united-states-court-having-jurisdiction-for-order-to-compel-arbitration-notice-and-service-thereof-hearing-and-determinationSection 4

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-7-witnesses-before-arbitrators-fees-compelling-attendance Section 7

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-7-witnesses-before-arbitrators-fees-compelling-attendanceSection 7

who

Washington

National

Insurance

Co.

https://casetext.com/case/badgerow-v-walters-6Badgerow v. Walters 142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022)

OBEX

https://casetext.com/case/wash-natl-ins-co-v-obex-grp-llc-1#p134958 F.3d 126, 134

https://casetext.com/case/amgen-inc-v-kidney-ctr-of-delaware-cnty#p56795 F.3d 562, 567–568

(

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-7-witnesses-before-arbitrators-fees-compelling-attendanceSection 7

Group

LLC

Amgen

Inc.

Kidney

Center

Del.

Cty.

Ltd.

Maine

https://casetext.com/case/me-cmty-health-options-v-albertsons-cos#p726993 F.3d 720, 726

(

Community

Health

Options

Albertsons

Cos.

Third

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-9-award-of-arbitrators-confirmation-jurisdiction-procedureSections 9

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-10-same-vacation-grounds-rehearing10

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-11-same-modification-or-correction-grounds-orderSection 11

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-9-award-of-arbitrators-confirmation-jurisdiction-procedureSection 9

https://casetext.com/case/directv-inc-v-imburgiaL.Ed.2d 365 (2015) (THOMAS, J., dissenting).

https://casetext.com/case/badgerow-v-walters-6Badgerow v. Walters 142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022)

https://casetext.com/case/cable-v-directv#p1351em,e.g.

Beck's

Superior

Hybrids,

Inc.

(

)

Henderson

https://casetext.com/case/cable-v-directv#p597P.3d 586, 597 (2008) (holding that

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-11-same-modification-or-correction-grounds-order11

https://casetext.com/case/in-re-becks-superior-hybrids-inc#p362940 N.E.2d 352, 362–363

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-7-witnesses-before-arbitrators-fees-compelling-attendance§ 7

https://casetext.com/case/henderson-v-summerville-ford-mercury-inc#p450em,Summerville

https://casetext.com/case/vaden-v-discover-bank-3#p65purpose of arbitration is to avoid litigation. 556 U.S., at 65,

https://casetext.com/case/moses-h-cone-hospital-v-mercury-constr-corp#p23U.S. 1, 23,

;

id.

(

https://casetext.com/case/moses-h-cone-hospital-v-mercury-constr-corp103 S.Ct. 927

https://casetext.com/case/badgerow-v-walters-6Badgerow v. Walters 142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022)

Underwood

https://casetext.com/case/pierce-v-underwood#p563487 U.S. 552, 563

https://casetext.com/case/pierce-v-underwood108 S.Ct. 2541

https://casetext.com/case/pierce-v-underwood101 L.Ed.2d 490

(

would

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-5-appointment-of-arbitrators-or-umpireSection 5

’

normally

havejurisdiction

controversy

between

the

parties

Ibid.

;

id.

https://casetext.com/case/badgerow-v-walters-6Badgerow v. Walters 142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022)

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-4-failure-to-arbitrate-under-agreement-petition-to-united-states-court-having-jurisdiction-for-order-to-compel-arbitration-notice-and-service-thereof-hearing-and-determination9 U.S.C. §§ 4

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-5-appointment-of-arbitrators-or-umpire5

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-7-witnesses-before-arbitrators-fees-compelling-attendance7

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-9-award-of-arbitrators-confirmation-jurisdiction-procedure9

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-10-same-vacation-grounds-rehearing10

https://casetext.com/statute/united-states-code/title-9-arbitration/chapter-1-general-provisions/section-11-same-modification-or-correction-grounds-order11

https://casetext.com/case/badgerow-v-walters-6Badgerow v. Walters 142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022)

142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022)思维导图模板大纲

Decided Mar 31, 2022思维导图模板大纲

No. 20- 1143思维导图模板大纲

03-31-2022思维导图模板大纲

Denise A. BADGEROW, Petitioner v. Greg WALTERS, et al.思维导图模板大纲

Daniel L. Geyser, Los Angeles, for the petitioner. Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, DC, for the respondents. Amanda Butler Schley, Business Law Group, New Orleans, LA, Daniel L. Geyser, Counsel of Record, Ryan N. Gardner Haynes and Boone, LLP, Dallas, TX, for petitioner. Daniel L. Geyser, Alexander Dubose & Jefferson LLP, Walnut Glen Tower, Dallas, TX, Amanda Butler Schley, Business Law Group, New Orleans, LA, Counsel of Record, for petitioner. Eve B. Masinter E. Fredrick Preis, Jr. Matthew M. McCluer Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, L.L.P., New Orleans, LA, Lisa S. Blatt, Counsel of Record, Sarah M. Harris Katherine Moran Meeks Sumeet Dang, Aaron Z. Roper Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington, DC, for respondents.思维导图模板大纲

Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court.思维导图模板大纲

Daniel L. Geyser, Los Angeles, for the petitioner.思维导图模板大纲

Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, DC, for the respondents.思维导图模板大纲

Amanda Butler Schley, Business Law Group, New Orleans, LA, Daniel L. Geyser, Counsel of Record, Ryan N. Gardner Haynes and Boone, LLP, Dallas, TX, for petitioner.思维导图模板大纲

Daniel L. Geyser, Alexander Dubose & Jefferson LLP, Walnut Glen Tower, Dallas, TX, Amanda Butler Schley, Business Law Group, New Orleans, LA, Counsel of Record, for petitioner.思维导图模板大纲

Eve B. Masinter E. Fredrick Preis, Jr. Matthew M. McCluer Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, L.L.P., New Orleans, LA, Lisa S. Blatt, Counsel of Record, Sarah M. Harris Katherine Moran Meeks Sumeet Dang, Aaron Z. Roper Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington, DC, for respondents.思维导图模板大纲

Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the 思维导图模板大纲

party may apply to the court to confirm, or alternatively to vacate, an arbitral award.思维导图模板大纲

Yet the federal courts, as we have often held, may or may not have jurisdiction to decide such a request. The Act's authorization of a petition does not itself create jurisdiction. Rather, the federal court must have what we have called an "independent jurisdictional basis" to resolve the matter. 思维导图模板大纲

of examining the parties’ underlying dispute. The text of Section 4, we reasoned, instructs a federal court to "look through" the petition to the "underlying substantive controversy" between the parties—even though that controversy is not before the court. 思维导图模板大纲

The question presented here is whether that same "look-through" approach to jurisdiction applies to requests to confirm or vacate arbitral awards under the FAA's Sections 9 and 10. We hold it does not. Those sections lack Section 4's distinctive language directing a look-through, on which 思维导图模板大纲

I思维导图模板大纲

This case grows out of the arbitration of an employment dispute. Petitioner Denise Badgerow worked as a financial advisor for REJ Properties, a firm run by respondents Greg Walters, Thomas Meyer, and Ray Trosclair. (For ease of reference, we refer from now on only to Walters.) Badgerow's contract required her to bring claims arising out of her employment to arbitration, rather than to court. So when she was (in her view, improperly) fired, she initiated an arbitration action against Walters, alleging unlawful termination under both federal and state law. The arbitrators sided with Walters, dismissing Badgerow's claims.思维导图模板大纲

What happened afterward—when Badgerow refused to give up—created the jurisdictional issue we address today. Believing that fraud had tainted the arbitration proceeding, Badgerow sued Walters in Louisiana state court to vacate the arbitral decision. Walters responded by removing the case to Federal District Court—and, once there,思维导图模板大纲

applying to confirm the arbitral award. Finally, Badgerow moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that the federal court lacked jurisdiction over the parties’ requests—under 1315Sections *1315 10 and 9, respectively—to vacate思维导图模板大纲

or confirm the award.思维导图模板大纲

The District Court assessed its jurisdiction under the look through approach this Court adopted in 思维导图模板大纲

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's finding of jurisdiction, relying on a just-issued Circuit precedent. See 思维导图模板大纲

2思维导图模板大纲

Courts have divided over whether the look- through approach used in 思维导图模板大纲

1 Compare 思维导图模板大纲

(CA5 2020) (holding that the look-through思维导图模板大纲

approach applies to applications to思维导图模板大纲

confirm, vacate, or modify an arbitral思维导图模板大纲

award); 思维导图模板大纲

(same); 思维导图模板大纲

(CA2 2016) (same); 思维导图模板大纲

look-through approach does not apply to思维导图模板大纲

those applications); 思维导图模板大纲

(CA7 2016) (same).思维导图模板大纲

II思维导图模板大纲

The district courts of the United States are courts of limited jurisdiction, defined (within constitutional bounds) by federal statute. See, 思维导图模板大纲

District courts have power to decide diversity cases—suits between citizens of different States as 思维导图模板大纲

But that is not necessarily true of FAA-created arbitration actions. As noted above, the FAA authorizes parties to arbitration agreements to file specified actions in federal court—most prominently, petitions to compel arbitration (under Section 4) and applications to confirm, vacate, or modify arbitral awards (under Sections 9 through 11). See 思维导图模板大纲

2 This Court has held that the FAA's core substantive requirement—Section 2's command to enforce arbitration agreements like other contracts—applies in state courts, just as it does in federal courts. See 思维导图模板大纲

7 U. L. A. 26 (2009) (adopted in 21 States and the District of Columbia); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Ann. §§ 1285– 1287.6 (West 2022); N. Y. Civ. Prac. Law Ann. §§ 7510– 7511 (West 2022).思维导图模板大纲

The issue here is about where a federal court should look to determine whether an action brought under Section 9 or 10 has an independent jurisdictional basis. An obvious place is the face of the application itself. If it shows that the contending parties are citizens of different States (with over $75,000 in dispute), then 思维导图模板大纲

1317arbitral award. That award is no *1317 more than a contractual resolution of the parties’ dispute—a 思维导图模板大纲

In 思维导图模板大纲

In full, the relevant sentence of Section 4思维导图模板大纲

3思维导图模板大纲

reads: "A party aggrieved by the alleged思维导图模板大纲

failure, neglect, or refusal of another to思维导图模板大纲

arbitrate under a written agreement for思维导图模板大纲

arbitration may petition any United States思维导图模板大纲

district court which, save for such思维导图模板大纲

agreement, would have jurisdiction under思维导图模板大纲

title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of思维导图模板大纲

the subject matter of a suit arising out of思维导图模板大纲

the controversy between the parties, for an思维导图模板大纲

order directing that such arbitration思维导图模板大纲

proceed in the manner provided for in such思维导图模板大纲

agreement."思维导图模板大纲

To show why that is so, we proceeded methodically through Section 4's wording. "The phrase ‘save for [the arbitration] agreement, ’ " we began, "indicates that the district court should assume the absence of the arbitration agreement and determine whether [the court] ‘would have jurisdiction ... ’ without it." 思维导图模板大纲

But Sections 9 and 10, in addressing applications to confirm or vacate an arbitral award, contain none of the statutory language on which 思维导图模板大纲

marks omitted). We have no warrant to redline the FAA, importing Section 4's consequential language into provisions containing nothing like it. Congress could have replicated Section 4's look-through instruction in Sections 9 and 10. Or for that matter, it could have drafted a global look- through provision, applying the approach throughout the FAA. But Congress did neither. And its decision governs.思维导图模板大纲

4 Section 9 provides, in relevant part, that if思维导图模板大纲

an arbitration agreement states "that a思维导图模板大纲

judgment of the court shall be entered upon思维导图模板大纲

the [arbitral] award," then a "party to the思维导图模板大纲

arbitration may apply" within a year to the思维导图模板大纲

federal court located where the award was思维导图模板大纲

made (or any other court specified) "for an思维导图模板大纲

order confirming the award, and thereupon思维导图模板大纲

the court must grant such an order unless思维导图模板大纲

the award is vacated, modified, or思维导图模板大纲

corrected" as the Act otherwise prescribes.思维导图模板大纲

Section 10 provides, in relevant part, that a思维导图模板大纲

United States court "may make an order思维导图模板大纲

vacating the award upon the application of思维导图模板大纲

any party to the arbitration" if the award is思维导图模板大纲

tainted in any of four specified ways.思维导图模板大纲

Nothing in that conclusion changes because a jurisdictional question is before us. The federal "district courts may not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory basis." 思维导图模板大纲

wanted it applied to petitions brought under that provision. See 思维导图模板大纲

Walters contests that view of the statute. Unlike the Courts of Appeals to have adopted his position, including the Fifth Circuit below, see 思维导图模板大纲

1319*1319 Walters's argument comes in two parts. First, Walters says, the language in Section 4 that 思维导图模板大纲

5 By contrast, the dissenting opinion reads,思维导图模板大纲

from start to finish, more like the decisions思维导图模板大纲

of the courts below: Even when that思维导图模板大纲

opinion finally turns to the FAA's text, it思维导图模板大纲

emphasizes something much like the lower思维导图模板大纲

courts’ uniformity principle. See 思维导图模板大纲

1326 – 1328; 思维导图模板大纲

Because, the dissent says, all the FAA's思维导图模板大纲

sections "describe connected components思维导图模板大纲

of a single matter" (namely, a "court's思维导图模板大纲

arbitration-related enforcement power"),思维导图模板大纲

and because those provisions serve the思维导图模板大纲

same "general purpose[ ]," the statute思维导图模板大纲

"permits" a court to hold that "Section 4's思维导图模板大纲

jurisdictional rule should apply思维导图模板大纲

throughout." 思维导图模板大纲

inevitable) connection among a statute's思维导图模板大纲

diverse provisions does not give a court思维导图模板大纲

carte blanche to move rules or concepts思维导图模板大纲

from any one section to any or all others.思维导图模板大纲

For the reasons already stated, we cannot思维导图模板大纲

read this non-uniform statute—setting out a思维导图模板大纲

jurisdictional rule in one section but思维导图模板大纲

conspicuously omitting it in all others—as思维导图模板大纲

though it applied a single rule throughout.思维导图模板大纲

See 思维导图模板大纲

But Walters's understanding of Section 4 does not comport with what it says. The language of that provision never mentions "venue"; it refers only to "jurisdiction." That is a signal, sharp and clear, that the section provides a jurisdictional rule. And even suppose (against all odds) that Congress had meant to state the venue rule Walters proposes without ever using the word "venue." In that event, Congress could have simply permitted filing the petition in any district court with jurisdiction (or even more simply—because a court can never act without jurisdiction—in any district court). Given that (in Walters's view) the jurisdictional rule comes from another provision, Congress would not have needed to (again) spell out its content. But spelling out the rule's content —by describing the look-through method—is exactly what Section 4 does. That description can serve one purpose only: to establish jurisdiction where it would otherwise not exist.思维导图模板大纲

And that is how 思维导图模板大纲

Walters's theory fares no better in construing Section 6's mention of motions to prescribe a look-through rule for the whole FAA. Here, 1320Walters commits the opposite *1320 of his fault in reading Section 4: He now reads a provision containing no express reference to jurisdiction in fact to set out a jurisdictional rule. There may be rare contexts in which courts can, without such a reference, "infer that Congress has expanded our jurisdiction"—but this is not one. 思维导图模板大纲

not just oblique but simply bizarre. Courts, after all, do not possess jurisdiction to decide ordinary motions by virtue of the look-through method. A motion (unlike a typical FAA application) is part of a case actually in court. Jurisdiction to decide the case includes jurisdiction to decide the motion; there is no need to "look through" the motion in search of a jurisdictional basis outside the court. And if the look-through rule does not apply to motions, then Section 6's reference to motions cannot direct the look-through rule. We have formerly described that provision's function as something different: Section 6, we said, ensures that FAA applications "get streamlined treatment"—a kind of "expedited review," as compared to what a party would receive if she 思维导图模板大纲

Walters's more thought-provoking arguments sound not in text but in policy. Here, Walters— now joined by the dissent—preaches the virtues of adopting look-through as a "single, easy-to-apply jurisdictional test" that will produce "sensible" results. Brief for Respondents 28 (internal quotation marks omitted); see 思维导图模板大纲

across a range of settings—for the Section 9 and 10 applications at issue here, as well as for Section 5 and 7 petitions (obviously not at issue) to appoint arbitrators or compel the presence of witnesses. 思维导图模板大纲

1321of disputes raising *1321 "思维导图模板大纲

6 The dissent's lead item in this vein思维导图模板大纲

concerns a Section 5 petition to appoint an思维导图模板大纲

arbitrator that is made "in tandem with" a思维导图模板大纲

Section 4 petition over which a federal思维导图模板大纲

court has jurisdiction. 思维导图模板大纲

Because Section 5 is not at issue here, we思维导图模板大纲

do not express any view about whether the思维导图模板大纲

relationship that the dissent hypothesizes思维导图模板大纲

would give the court jurisdiction over the思维导图模板大纲

appointment request.思维导图模板大纲

Walters himself quotes back to us the topline answer to those theories, reflecting its obviousness: "Even the most formidable policy arguments cannot overcome a clear statutory directive." 思维导图模板大纲

And anyway, we think Walters oversells the superiority of his proposal. First, uniformity in and of itself provides no real advantage in this sphere. A court can tell in an instant whether an application arises under Section 4 or, as here, under Section 9 or 10; so it can also tell in an instant whether to apply the look-through method or the usual jurisdictional rules. Second, the use of those ordinary rules—most notably, relating to diversity jurisdiction—is hardly beyond judicial capacity. Federal courts have faced, and federal courts have resolved, diversity questions for over two centuries, in diverse and ever-changing legal contexts. Throughout, they have developed workable rules; and we see no reason to think they will do differently here. Indeed, past practice belies Walters's and the dissent's gloomy predictions. Although they spin out hypotheticals designed to make the project look ultra-confusing, they fail to identify any actual problems that have arisen from courts’ longstanding application of diversity standards to FAA applications (without using look-through). And Walters's solution does not even avoid the (purported) difficulty of which he complains. For he does not claim (nor could he) that look-through is the exclusive means of establishing federal jurisdiction. Even if the underlying action does not fall within a district court's jurisdiction, the application still might do so—say, because the parties have changed, and are now diverse. See 思维导图模板大纲

Finally, we can see why Congress chose to place fewer arbitration disputes in federal court than Walters wishes. The statutory plan, as suggested above, makes Section 9 and 10 applications conform to the normal—and sensible—judicial division of labor: The applications go to state, rather than federal, courts when they raise claims between non-diverse parties involving state law. See 思维导图模板大纲

The result, as Walters laments, is to give state courts a significant role in implementing the FAA. But we have long recognized that feature of the statute. "[E]nforcement of the Act," we have understood, "is left in large part to the state courts." 思维导图模板大纲

* * *思维导图模板大纲

For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.思维导图模板大纲

It is so ordered.思维导图模板大纲

Justice BREYER, dissenting.思维导图模板大纲

When interpreting a statute, it is often helpful to consider not simply the statute's literal words, but also the statute's purposes and the likely consequences of our interpretation. Otherwise, we risk adopting an interpretation that, even if consistent with text, creates unnecessary complexity and confusion. That, I fear, is what the majority's interpretation here will do. I consequently dissent.思维导图模板大纲

I思维导图模板大纲

The question presented arises in the context of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 思维导图模板大纲

the attendance" of witnesses whom the arbitrator has "summoned"; Section 9, which gives "the United States court in and for the district within which" an arbitration award "was made" the power to enter an "order confirming the award"; Section 10, which gives "the United States court in and for the district wherein the [arbitration] award was made" the power to "make an order vacating 1323the *1323 award"; and Section 11, which gives "the United States court in and for the district wherein the [arbitration] award was made" the power to "modif[y] or correc[t] the award." 思维导图模板大纲

At first blush, one might wonder why there is 思维导图模板大纲

We made clear how this works in 思维导图模板大纲

asks whether it would have jurisdiction over 思维导图模板大纲

The 思维导图模板大纲

"any United States district court which, 思维导图模板大纲

The words "save for [the arbitration] agreement," we reasoned, tell a court not to find jurisdiction by looking to the petition to enforce the agreement itself, but instead to the underlying controversy 思维导图模板大纲

The second reason, which the majority today neglects, was practical. 思维导图模板大纲

Today, the majority holds that this look-through approach does not apply to 思维导图模板大纲

language. 思维导图模板大纲

It also creates what I fear will be consequences that are overly complex and impractical.思维导图模板大纲

II思维导图模板大纲

I would use the look-through approach to determine jurisdiction under each of the FAA's related provisions— 思维导图模板大纲

Consider some of the likely consequences of the majority's reading, which applies the look-through approach only to 思维导图模板大纲

raises a federal question, but the application to appoint an arbitrator raises no federal question and does not establish diversity? A party could ask a federal judge to 思维导图模板大纲

Moreover, diversity jurisdiction requires not only that the relevant parties be from different States but also that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000. See 思维导图模板大纲

confirming the award." 思维导图模板大纲

Or suppose that a party asks a federal court to vacate an arbitration award under 思维导图模板大纲

Relatedly, the majority also notes, correctly, that 思维导图模板大纲

It may be possible to eliminate some of these problems by using a federal-question lawsuit or 思维导图模板大纲

I relate these practical difficulties in part to illustrate a more fundamental point. The majority has tried to split what is, or should be, a single jurisdictional atom—a single statute with connected parts, which parts give federal judges the power to facilitate a single arbitration proceeding from start to finish: to order arbitration; appoint an arbitrator; summon witnesses; and confirm, vacate, or modify an arbitration award. The need for simplicity, comprehension, workability, and fairness all suggest that these interrelated provisions should follow the same basic jurisdictional approach, namely, as 思维导图模板大纲

III思维导图模板大纲

The majority's interpretation is also at odds with 1327what this Court has said about *1327 the purposes underlying the FAA. We have recognized that the statute reflects a clear " ‘policy of rapid and unobstructed enforcement of arbitration 思维导图模板大纲

We have thus interpreted the FAA to avoid "unnecessarily complicating the law and breeding litigation from a statute that seeks to avoid it." 思维导图模板大纲

other words, the FAA 思维导图模板大纲

IV思维导图模板大纲

The majority's main point is straightforward: The text of the statute compels the result. As the majority rightly points out, we cannot disregard the statutory text or "overcome a clear statutory directive." 思维导图模板大纲

That fact, however, does not produce the "clear statutory directive" upon which the majority relies. Nothing in the text prohibits us from applying 思维导图模板大纲

Moreover, when we consider 思维导图模板大纲

with jurisdiction as determined by the look- through approach. Requests under the FAA's various sections are also generally described in the text as "applications" or "motions." See 思维导图模板大纲

1328*1328 Modern Dictionary of the English Language 446 ( 1911) ("motion in court" means "an application to a court ... to have a rule or order made which is necessary to the progress of the action").思维导图模板大纲

And, more importantly, all the sections describe connected components of a single matter: a federal court's arbitration-related enforcement power. One can read these sections as a single whole, with each section providing one enforcement tool, and one section—Section 4—providing both an enforcement tool and a jurisdictional rule applicable to the entire toolbox. Read this way, the FAA provides one set of complementary mechanisms through which a federal court might facilitate a single arbitration—but only when the underlying substantive controversy is one that, jurisdictionally speaking, could be brought in a federal court had the parties not agreed to arbitrate. There is no language in any of the sections that states, or suggests, that we cannot interpret the Act in this way.思维导图模板大纲

In brief, the text does not prevent us from reading the statute in a way that better reflects the statute's structure and better fulfills the statute's basic 思维导图模板大纲

V思维导图模板大纲

The FAA's legislative history reinforces the view of the statute that I have just described. The Senate Report on the bill that became the FAA refers to the FAA's general purposes. It makes clear Congress’ hope to avoid procedural complexity. It refers to parties’ "desire to avoid the delay and expense of litigation." S. Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 ( 1924). Proponents of the bill thought it would successfully serve that purpose because it would provide "very simple machinery"; "simplify legal matters"; offer "speedy" and "plain justice"; and allow "no opportunity for technical procedure." Joint Hearings on S. 1005 et al. before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 16, 26, 27, 36 ( 1924) (hereinafter Joint Hearings). These general purposes support a simplified jurisdictional rule.思维导图模板大纲

The language of the House Report suggests more. It suggests that the bill created a 思维导图模板大纲

The principal drafter of the bill made the same point yet more explicitly. He testified that under the FAA, "Federal courts are given jurisdiction to enforce [arbitration] agreements 思维导图模板大纲

Together, this history reinforces the interpretation of the statute that I would adopt. It suggests that Congress intended a single approach for determining jurisdiction of the FAA's interrelated enforcement mechanisms, not one approach for the mechanism provided in 思维导图模板大纲

* * *思维导图模板大纲

In this dissent I hope to have provided an example of what it means to say that we do not interpret a statute's words "in a vacuum." 思维导图模板大纲

I suggest that by considering not only the text, but context, structure, history, purpose, and common sense, we would read the statute here in a different way. That way would connect the statute more directly with the area of law, and of human life, that it concerns. And it would allow the statute,思维导图模板大纲

and the law, to work better and more simply for those whom it is meant to serve. With respect, I dissent.思维导图模板大纲

APPENDIX思维导图模板大纲

" 思维导图模板大纲

"A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. Five days’ notice in writing of such application shall be served upon the party in default. Service thereof shall be made in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The hearing and proceedings, under such agreement, shall be within the district in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration is filed. If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof. If no jury trial be demanded by the party alleged to be in default, or if the matter in dispute is within admiralty jurisdiction, the court shall hear and determine such issue. Where such an issue is raised, the party alleged to be in default may, except in cases of admiralty, on or 1330before the return day of the notice of *1330 application, demand a jury trial of such issue, and upon such demand the court shall make an order思维导图模板大纲

referring the issue or issues to a jury in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or may specially call a jury for that purpose. If the jury find that no agreement in writing for arbitration was made or that there is no default in proceeding thereunder, the proceeding shall be dismissed. If the jury find that an agreement for arbitration was made in writing and that there is a default in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof."思维导图模板大纲

" 思维导图模板大纲

"If in the agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed; but if no method be provided therein, or if a method be provided and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such method, or if for any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then upon the application of either party to the controversy the court shall designate and appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, who shall act under the said agreement with the same force and effect as if he or they had been specifically named therein; and unless otherwise provided in the agreement the arbitration shall be by a single arbitrator."思维导图模板大纲

" 思维导图模板大纲

"The arbitrators selected either as prescribed in this title or otherwise, or a majority of them, may summon in writing any person to attend before them or any of them as a witness and in a proper case to bring with him or them any book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed material as evidence in the case. The fees for such attendance shall be the same as the fees of witnesses before masters of the United States courts. Said summons shall issue in the name of the arbitrator or arbitrators, or a majority of them,思维导图模板大纲

and shall be signed by the arbitrators, or a majority of them, and shall be directed to the said person and shall be served in the same manner as subpoenas to appear and testify before the court; if any person or persons so summoned to testify shall refuse or neglect to obey said summons, upon petition the United States district court for the district in which such arbitrators, or a majority of them, are sitting may compel the attendance of such person or persons before said arbitrator or arbitrators, or punish said person or persons for contempt in the same manner provided by law for securing the attendance of witnesses or their punishment for neglect or refusal to attend in the courts of the United States."思维导图模板大纲

" 思维导图模板大纲

"If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. If no court is specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application may be made to the United States court in and for the district within which such award was made. Notice of the application shall be served upon the adverse party, and thereupon the court shall have jurisdiction of such party as 1331*1331 though he had appeared generally in the proceeding. If the adverse party is a resident of the district within which the award was made, such service shall be made upon the adverse party or his attorney as prescribed by law for service of notice of motion in an action in the same court. If the adverse party shall be a nonresident, then the notice of the application shall be served by the marshal of any district within which the adverse思维导图模板大纲

party may be found in like manner as other process of the court."思维导图模板大纲

" 思维导图模板大纲

"(a) In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration思维导图模板大纲

"( 1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;思维导图模板大纲

"(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;思维导图模板大纲

"(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or思维导图模板大纲

"(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.思维导图模板大纲

"(b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award to be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.思维导图模板大纲

"(c) The United States district court for the district wherein an award was made that was issued pursuant to section 580 of title 5 may make an order vacating the award upon the application of a person, other than a party to the arbitration, who is adversely affected or aggrieved by the award, if the use of arbitration or the award is clearly inconsistent with the factors set forth in section 572 of title 5."思维导图模板大纲

" 思维导图模板大纲

"In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the award was made may make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration思维导图模板大纲

"(a) Where there was an evident material思维导图模板大纲

miscalculation of figures or an evident material思维导图模板大纲

mistake in the description of any person, thing, or思维导图模板大纲

property referred to in the award.思维导图模板大纲

"(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a思维导图模板大纲

matter not submitted to them, unless it is a matter思维导图模板大纲

not affecting the merits of the decision upon the思维导图模板大纲

matter submitted.思维导图模板大纲

"(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of思维导图模板大纲

form not affecting the merits of the controversy.思维导图模板大纲

The order may modify and correct the award, so as思维导图模板大纲

to effect the intent thereof and promote justice思维导图模板大纲